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W.: Taxation--Exchange of Principal Residence; Exchange of Property H

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
hysteria, a picture inconsistent with alcoholic amnesia, and a clinical
examination negative for psychosis." DAVmSON, FoRENsic PsYCHIATEY

161 (1952).
In view of the thoroughness and stringency of these requirements, it is felt that in dealing with this phantasm, no marked differences should apply in establishing the validity of a plea of amnesia in civil cases. This would seem particularly necessary considering the frequent incidence of an attitude of an "open season" against
insurance companies, even on the part of the insured against his own
insurer. ]t is quite generally acknowledged that herein, many people believe that any means are justified in effecting recoveries from
insurance companies. Many persons do not realize that insurance
policies axe contracts defining not only the rights of both parties,
but also demanding certain duties from both.
In this case as reported, there was no indication that such testing
methods, or any part thereof, were applied to the defendant's plea
of amnesia. While the decision on the facts in this case may still
have been rendered in all due justice, it is submitted that in view of
the considerations presented herein, the courts should approach with
the greatest of caution those cases where a defendant claims so
spurious a reason as amnesia as the basis for his refusal to testify.
It not only appears to be perhaps the most difficult ground to prove,
but the possibilities of its abuse, are, for this very reason, the more
unpropitious to the insurer.
L. B. S.
TAXATION-EXCHANGE OF PRINCIPAL REsIDENCE; EXCHANGE OF
PRoPERiTY HELD FoR PRoDucrVE UsE.-Taxpayer's principal place of

residence, with a market value of $9,000, was located on his farm
which he held for productive use, their combined market value
being $90,200, and having a taxable basis of $45,000. He exchanged
both for another farm having a market value of $75,000, and received $15,200 as "boot" from the exchange. Within twelve months,
taxpayer invested in excess of the market value of his old residence
in a new principal residence, and allocated $9,000 of the "boot"
received on the exchange of productive property to the exchange
of residences. As a result of this allocation, taxpayer contended that
his taxable gain on the entire transaction was $6,200. Held, in an
action to recover taxes paid, that since the government had provided
no regulation applicable to this type of exchange, it could not com-
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plain when taxpayers made a reasonable allocation favorable to
themselves. Sayre v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 495 (S.D.W. Va.
1958).
The jury held that the exchange of farms was an exchange
of like property held for productive use, and where such property
is exchanged solely for like property, no taxable gain or loss in the
transaction is recognized. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, ch. 1, § 112(b)
(1), 53 Stat. 37 (now INT. Bnv. CODE OF 1954, § 1031(a)). However, where an exchange would fall within this'provision except
for the fact that money is received as a partial consideration for the

exchange, a gain is recognized to the extent of such money received.
INT. BEv. CODE OF 1939, ch. 1, § 112(c) (1), 53 Stat. 39 (now INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1031(b) ). In the principal case, if the whole
transaction was completed at the culmination of the exchange of
farms, the taxable gain to the taxpayer would have been recognized
to the extent of the "boot" received, in this case $15,200. See Coleman v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 758 (8th Cir. 1950); Trenton Cotton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1945).
The taxpayer complicated the transaction by investing in excess
of the market value of his old residence ($9,000.00) in a new principal residence within twelve months after the exchange of the residence for other property. INT.Rv.CODE OF 1939, § 112, added by ch.
521, § 318(n)(1), 65 Stat. 494 (1951) (now INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 1034(a)), states that gain in the exchange of principal
residences is recognized only to the extent that the taxpayer's selling
price of the old residence exceeds his cost of purchase of the new
residence. Exchange of the residence for other property is considered as a sale of such residence. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 112,
added by ch. 521, § 318(n) (2) (A), 65 Stat. 494 (1951) (now
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1034(c) (1)). Tax-payer, by applying
these statutes to his exchange, contends that he should be allowed
to deduct the $9,000 he reinvested from the $15,200 "boot" received
in the exchange, thus making his taxable gain from the entire transaction $6,200.
The government's contention is that of the "boot" received in
the exchange of property, only that fractional part apportionable
to the old residence should be applied to the later exchange of residences. This would allocate 90/902 of the $15,200 "boot" or $1,516.63, as being paid to tax-payer for the exchange of his principal
residence. The government further averred that taxpayer received
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this same fractional share of the $75,000 farm obtained in the exchange, as payment for his old principal residence. They arrive at
the taxable gain on the exchange of farms by totaling the entire
"boot" received on this exchange, $15,200, plus the amount received
as payment for the old residence, $7,483.37, less $9,000 reinvested
in the new residence, and contend the taxable gain on the entire
transaction to be $13,683.37.
This contention was rejected. The court said that at the end
of the entire transaction, taxpayer had substantially the same property as before, and the only economic gain to him was $6,200 of
the "boot" he had received, thus upholding the contention advanced
by taxpayer.
If the transaction be considered as an exchange of principal
residences, it is submitted that the contention advanced by the
government was correct, but that the allocation was carried to an
illogical extreme. The taxpayer, after exchanging his residence and
farm for another farm, did not receive 90/902 of a residence in
exchange, and it is contended that the allocation by the government of $7,483.37 as received for his residence is not correct. However, the same net result will be reached by omitting this allocation
entirely.
It is also submitted that the fact situation of the principal case
is covered by applicable regulations. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 112,
added by ch. 521, § 318(n) (1), 65 Stat. 494 (1951) (now INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 1034(a)), provides that no gain on the sale of a
principal residence shall be recognized for taxation purposes, if
within one year after such sale, taxpayer reinvested in excess of the
selling price in a new principal residence. Where property is used
by a taxpayer partially as a principal residence and partially for
other purposes, only that amount allocable to the selling price of
the residential portion need be reinvested for taxpayer to come
within the above provision relating to nonrecognition of such gain.
Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.112(n)-1(b) (1) (ii) (1953). Where taxpayer
does so use his residence partially for other purposes, as in the
case of an apartment over a store, or a home on a farm, the provision relating to nonrecognition of gain applies only to that portion
of the property used as a residence. Joint Committee Staff Summary
of Provisions of the Revenue Act of 1951, 1951-2 Cum. Bur.. 287,
310. In determining the gain on an exchange of principal residences,
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there must be an actual allocation of the selling price to the respective portions of the property as if there were two separate transactions. Rev. Rul. 286, 1953-2 Cum. BuLL. 20.
It is submitted that by application of these regulations the
transaction in the principal case can be construed as a sale of a
principal residence, with an apportionment of the "boot" received
in the exchange between the residence and the other property. This
would allocate 90/902 of the "boot" received, or $1,516.63, to the
residence, and the remainder allocable to the farm exchanged, making the taxable gain to the taxpayer as a result of the exchange of
like property held for productive use $13,683.37, the amount which
the government contended was correct.
It is contended that the government has provided, in the regulations herein discussed, applicable regulations for this exchange,
and that a consideration of them would lend support to the contention made by the government in this novel fact situation.
M. D. W., Jr.

ToRTs-AssMPN
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OF

RIsK AND ComrinTuronY NEGIaGENCE

AS

and P, residents of Florida, were planning
a trip to D's cabin at a lake resort in North Carolina. Upon arrival
at the resort but prior to going to D's cabin, P and D went to the
lakeside in D's truck, towing the latter's motorboat on a trailer which
was attached to the truck by an old and worn cable. D was familiar
with the launching procedure but P was not. When they attempted
to launch the boat, the truck bogged down, and after several unsuccessful attempts to free the boat and truck, D requested that P
push on the rear of the truck as he, D, attempted to pull it forward.
In the process the cable snapped and severed P's foot. In an action
for negligent tort the federal district court, sitting without a jury,
found for P. Held, on appeal, that D was guilty of actionable negligence in using the cable and in failing to warn P, and that P was not
guilty of contributory negligence in standing near the rear of the
truck at D's request. Ferguson v. Smith, 257 F.2d 694 (4th Cir.
1958).
SFPAiATE DEFNSES.-D

The court in the principal case concluded that the plaintiff was
not a social guest at D's home as they were not on D's property at
the time of the accident Thus P was not a licensee.
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